📦 rev65-attempt27-iterations11ofx
The stuff this cycle made, archived 2026-10-21 and rendered from
git show rev65-attempt27-iterations11ofx:stuff/….
rev65-attempt27-iterations11ofx:stuff/graduated-guardian-collusion-bound.md
Graduated-guardian collusion bound
Picks up the gap left open in probation-cosign-worked-example.md: what if the thief already controls a guardian who has finished probation?
Setup
- Roster: guardians A, B (honest, graduated), C (thief-controlled, graduated).
- Per-guardian grace floor = 2 × p99 outage, second-path confirmed, capped at the turn limit (cycle 62 learning). Honest ceiling here: 8h.
- Rules 1 and 2: a new guardian needs a quorum co-sign, then 30 days of probation, and adds freeze only when co-signed by a graduated guardian.
Attack
- C co-signs enrollment of D (thief-controlled). Quorum is 2 of 3, so A or B must also sign. If neither does, D is never enrolled. Thief gains 0h.
- Suppose an honest guardian signs by mistake. D serves probation and earns no freeze from its outages (rule 1).
- After probation, D's freeze needs a graduated co-signer (rule 2). C signs. Now D's outage counts.
Bound
C could already have frozen the key by cutting itself off: up to its own floor, 8h. D adds at most D's floor (8h) on top. So the thief gets 16h, and that is only possible after an honest guardian made a mistaken quorum signature.
Closing it
Count co-signed freeze per co-signer, not per guardian: a freeze that C co-signs comes out of C's own floor. Then C plus every guardian C sponsors shares one 8h budget, and the thief gets 8h, the same as C alone. A collusion ring can't add more freeze than the guardians it already controls.
| Case | Thief freeze |
| No graduated thief guardian | 0h beyond honest outages |
| Graduated C, per-guardian budget | 16h |
| Graduated C, per-co-signer budget | 8h (C's own floor) |
Still open: a thief who controls a quorum of graduated guardians already owns the roster, so no admission rule can help. That bound belongs to key creation.
rev65-attempt27-iterations11ofx:stuff/guardian-admission-protocol.md
Guardian admission protocol
Combines rule 1 (quorum co-sign plus 30-day probation) and rule 2 (only a graduated guardian's co-sign gives a new guardian freeze power) into one admission sequence. It also says what key creation has to fix in advance.
Sequence
- Propose. A quorum of the current roster (2 of 3 here) signs an enrollment record naming the new guardian G and its sponsor S. S must have completed probation.
- Probation (30 days). G can sign and observe. Its outages add no freeze. If S is removed during probation, G's probation resets.
- Graduate. At day 30, G's outages begin to count toward freeze, but they are charged to S's budget (the fix from graduated-guardian-collusion-bound.md). S and every guardian S sponsored share one floor of 2 x S's p99 outage.
- Earn its own budget. After G has sponsored nobody and kept its p99 history for a further 30 days, G gets its own floor, starting at the lower of S's floor and the roster median.
Thief's best case
| Thief controls | Admission possible? | Extra freeze beyond honest outages |
| nothing | no | 0h |
| 1 graduated guardian C (floor 8h) | only with an honest co-signer | 0h; C's sponsored guardians share C's 8h |
| a graduated quorum | yes | unbounded: the thief already owns the roster |
What key creation must fix
The last row can't be handled by admission rules. At key creation, the owner commits to:
- a roster size floor N_min, so that a quorum always needs more than half of the guardians who were present at creation;
- an absolute freeze cap T_max (the turn limit), which no budget can exceed;
- a creation-set anchor: removing any creation-set guardian needs the owner's key, not just a quorum.
With these in place, a thief who captures a quorum still can't freeze for longer than T_max. They also can't remove honest creation-set guardians to make room for their own.
Still open
Step 4's 30-day "own budget" wait is set by hand. It should be derived from how long it takes to measure p99 with confidence.
rev65-attempt27-iterations11ofx:stuff/probation-cosign-worked-example.md
Probation + co-sign: worked example
Applies rule 1 (quorum co-sign + 30-day probation, probation outages give no freeze) and rule 2 (post-creation guardian adds freeze only when co-signed by a guardian that has completed probation).
Setup
- Key created with guardians A and B. Each has a grace floor of 2 × its p99 outage: A = 6h, B = 8h. Turn limit = 24h.
- Honest freeze ceiling today: max(A, B) = 8h.
Attack
- Thief steals the key and enrolls guardian T (thief-controlled).
- Rule 1: enrollment needs a quorum of A and B to co-sign. The thief holds neither, so T is never enrolled. Freeze gained: 0h.
- Suppose the thief tricks A into co-signing. T is still on probation for 30 days. The thief cuts T off at once. Rule 1: probation outages count toward no freeze. Freeze gained: 0h.
- Suppose T finishes probation, then is cut off. Rule 2: T's outage adds freeze only if a guardian that has completed probation (A or B) co-signs the freeze. Honest A and B see their own path is up and refuse. Freeze gained: 0h beyond the honest 8h.
Result
| Step | Thief freeze beyond honest ceiling |
| Enroll without quorum | 0h (blocked) |
| Cut off in probation | 0h |
| Cut off after | 0h unless an honest guardian signs |
The median-wait gap from cycle 62 closes: a new guardian never sets the wait by itself, so with two guardians the thief cannot buy one guardian's floor.
Remaining gap
If the thief controls a guardian that has completed probation, rule 2 lets it co-sign T's freeze. That is the same power the thief already had through that guardian, so the bound is unchanged, but the two outages now add, not overlap.